lnttoduclion
When you first arnve as a member of the
Multinational Brigade North (MNB(N)), you
are fu ll of promise. You know your team of
highly trained professional soldiers will make a
difference in the lives of those that live in BiH.
Then it sets in. Your six-month tour of duty
doesn't allow you ti me to finish what you
starr. So what is ir you can do to make a diffe rence in only six months? T his is the exact
question rhar starred rhe process of developing
rhe U.S. Army National Guard Demining
Initiative in BiH. This initiative was undertaken by the U.S. Army's National Guard, an
adjunct to rhe U.S. Armed Forces. There are
multitudes of issues you can work ro resolve in
Bozn ia-Herzegovina (BiH). MNB(N) plays a
supporting role in most of these, bur we wanted ro do something more. We wanted to bring
a fresh idea to the area of operation (AO ) rhar
would make a significant impact on one of the
many critical issues facing BiH. To make our
choice, we focused on two key concerns:
"What will have the biggest impact on rhe
daily lives of rhe people?" and "What will
instill confidence in the international community ro speed up economic recovery?" We
chose the issue of demining.

Relhinkinu How We Do Demining
II
So why choose demining? As a military officer, I have always been told to stare
rhe bottom li ne up front no matter how bad
the situation. So here it is: seven years after
Dayton, progress in clearing mines in BiH is
far from what is required to create a safe and
secure environment. Containment (marking/
fencing) efforts are almost non-existent.

The mine threat in BiH is widespread, of low density and dispersed.The
IEBL is rhe dividing line between the entity
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rhe technological advantages of a modern,
well-equipped humanitarian demining ream.
Such military organizations are something the
U.S. Army National Guard is uniquely suired
for. The U.S. Army National Guard in itself is
an exceptional organization known worldwide
for irs ability to quickly adapt to the everchanging req uirements of international security environs. Our success in managing dynamic peacekeeping operations is well-known.
T he U.S. Army National Guard is
currently involved in the New Horizons exercises that focus on developing emerging doctri ne and operational skills for humanitarian
and civil assistance missions. These mandates,
combined with our operational experience in
peacekeeping operations, will rhrusr the U.S.
Army National Guard into rhe forefront of
modern humanitarian doctrinal development.
This is why I say we must perform this mission of thinking outside the military norms of
yesterday.

When you ftrst arrive as a member of the Multinational Brigade
North (MNB(N)), you are full of promise. You know your team of highly
trained professional soldiers will make a difference in the lives of those who
live in BiH. Then it sets in. Your six-month tour of duty doesn't allow you
time to finish what you started. So what is it you can do to make a difference in only six months? This exact question started the process of developing the National Guard Demining Initiative in BiH. There are multitudes of issues you can work to resolve in BiH. MNB(N) plays a supporting role in most of these, but we wanted to do something more. We wanted to bring a fresh idea to the area of operation (AO) that would make a
significant impact on one of the many critical issues facing BiH. To make
our choice, we focused on two key concerns: "W'hat will have the biggest
impact on the daily lives of the people?" and "What will instill confidence
in the international community to speed up economic recovery?" We chose
the issue of demining.
armed forces at the end of hostilities as d efined
by the Dayton Peace Accord (GFAP) . This
heavily mined area is probably the single most
important factor affecting our continued support of two key military tasks.
I
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The first key military task affected
is our ability to "provide a safe and secure
environment" in Bi H. So far in 2003, mine
strikes have caused 13 deaths and five serious
injuries 1 1n th e MNB(N) Area of
Responsibility (AOR) alone. More than 2, 100
sq km ofBiH requires a "Technical Survey" to
determine if rhe area is mined.2 Technical
evaluations have estimated rhar 400 sq km to
1,000 sq km of this suspect area will require
"Clearance Operations" of some sorr3 that
include mechanical and manual clearing techniques. The key pro perry of these operations is
they must meer humanitarian demining standards if we are to provide a permanent solution for a safe and secure environment.
H old on a minute. Military reams
don't perform humanitarian demining. So
why are we focusing on this issue? Mainly

because we have to. In the modern world of
the coalition forces, rhe military is nor always
provided with defined limits for tasks that
their forces m ust effectively perfo rm to meet
coalition objectives. This is especially true in
rhe world of Stabilization and Securi ty
Operations (SASO) like the tasks we are currently performing in BiH and will soon perfo rm in Iraq .
As we have seen in recent headlines,
our military leaders are also realizing this
truth. As you read this article, military leaders
are working to implement these new prio rities
before they become roadblocks to security
around the world. If we are to be successful in
rhis transitional process, we must be active ar
all levels of expertise. While mili tary leaders
are focused on changing policies that address
our demining limits, we ar the tactical level
must be ready to respond with a well-developed plan o f action to meet these new SASO
priorities. T he plan we are proposing is the
first step in meeting o ne of rhese new priorities. Our pro posal combines the cri tical
strengths of solid leadership and unified command rhat military organizatio ns possess with
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The second key military rask affected by the BiH mine risk is our abili ty to
"maimain free dom of movement." Freedom
of movement is a key ingredient in eliminating threats to economic development and to
allow displaced persons and refugees (DPRE)
to return. Bur today's slow and inconsistent
demining processes are unable to meer the
demands of rhese humanitarian missions.
Over the past few years, the average clearance
rate of all demining operations in BiH is six sq
km per year. That's about 1.5 percent of rhe
suspecred area of risk. The cost to dare for all
demining in BiH is $100 million (U.S .) or an
average of $ 16.6 millio n per year. To accomplish even this minimal level of success
involves the work of the Armed Forces in Bi H
(AF BiH) demining teams and the efforts of
42 non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/
commercial activities that arc accredited to
demine by rhe Bosnia-Herzegovina M ine
Action Center (BHMAC) . These NGOs and
commercial activities provide most of the
mechanical supporr (fl ails and vegetation cutters) required bur ar a premium cost. The AF
BiH demining reams have far less equipment
bur they have the most experienced and welltrai ned deminers available; plus their hearts
are in it. Of this six sq km total per year, the
International T rust Fund for Demining (ITF)
srated that NGOs and commercial acriviries
completed 2.3 sq km in 2002.4 Based on this
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fi nding, the AF BiH dcminers appear ro perform rhe bulk of rhe demining efforts with the
least amount of equipment and personnel.

build ing mili tary and diplomatic support for
rhe initiative

Time to Take It Up a Nolch
Let us nor forger the International
Community (IC) is also watching. Based on
various inputs from gro ups such as rhe
Organization for Security Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and other key diplomatic
agencies, the IC goal for demining success in
BiH was derermined to be 12 sq km per yea r.5
The IC feels this level of reduction is a key
indicator for the economic growth of BiH and
is one of the "confidence" barometers they use
to judge rhe ability ofBiH to create rhe secure
and stable environment that is paramount for
joining the Eu ropean Un ion (EU) . This confidence level equates to investment opportunity and faster economic recove1y for BiH. So
here's some more bad news. Based on the success of the current demining approacl1 in Bi H ,
it will rake 60 to 200 years to demine BiH.
The United Narions D evelopment Program
(UNDP) esrimares the funding required to
accomplish this demining at $26 million per
year.6 It is easy to see we lack the funds, we
lack rhe rime and we lack the patien ce to sacrifice the life of another innocent human due
to our inability to ch ange an outdated military
paradigm.
\\,.,

The question for our team now is
"What do we change?" I LT Richard Weber,
Officer in C harge (OIC) of the SFOR 12
Mine Cell , completed the initial concept for a
Demining Brigade in early 2003. The original
concept was to develop a Demining Brigade
that could meet BiH domestic mandates as
well as other international mandates. I LT
Weber's unique design integrated rhe
strengths of a military organization with the
technological advantages of a modern humanitarian demini ng team. T here have been various equivalents of lesser size (i.e., Berlin Wall
ream, ere.) bur never before has there been
such a forceful effort to make humanitarian
dcmining a permanent milirary mission.
Before handing over the reins to SFOR 13,
1LT Weber developed a well-tho ught-our
technical design fo r the brigade that became
rhe basis fo r rhe T able of Organization and
Equipment (TOE) used in our current d esign.
Based on this in itial design, SFOR 13 was
ready to move the concept to rhe next level by
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To build this support, we needed to
show why this humanitarian demining ream
would be successful where others fa iled . So
what are the failings the initiative needed ro
answer' While some of rhe lack of success may
be attributed to rhc nature of rhe mine threat,
much is due to inefficiency, mismanagement
and the appearance of corruption in rhe
bureaucracy. To answer rhese concerns, we
concentrated on four critical areas of foc us.
1. An integrated demining effort
is required: First was the need for a demining operation that is integrated from the
state level down to the individual deminer.
The current method of demining does not
adequately integrate demining operations
and wastes valuable time and resources.
Military clearance procedures, although
weH integrated and fast in nature, do not
provide the 99.6 percent clearance level
mandated by International Humanitarian
standards in SASO environments. Our initiative must integrate mechanical means,
manual demining efforts, Explosive
Detecting Dog Teams (EDDTs) and containment practices. Although we use these
four methods today, they are not integrated
at the level required to be consistently effective. NGOs, commercial activities, and AF
BiH are all used to perform these tasks in a
fractional manner due to competing agendas and interests.
2. The BHMAC and government
control: The BiH Demining Law of
February 2002 set standards for BiH demining in line with international protocols.
This law is crucial leverage for the success
of demining in BiH and must be fully supported by our proposal. This law allows the
BiH government to endorse the BHMAC
by providing two key mandates:
• T he BH MAC is rhe sole national
authority for rhc coordinatio n of mine clearance.
• The BHMAC is the o nly
inst itution
responsible
fo r
nationa l
standards and quality assurance.
Since the formation of the
BHMAC and the reorganization of its

In his book l'rog>Yss in 1/mnmull/rt•W /Jemmmg: I ulmiml 1111d Polu I' Clutflntgo,
Richard Garwin ha' csumatcd '' ,.;[ ta1,e 1,000 )can 10 d<·mtne the world ba~cd on roda• ~
tcchnolnl,'"\ an<l pr.lcllce,. A rhou•aml \<~n is roo long 10 "all for a mrm free \\orld. We
mu.1 act nnw 1<1 ch~ngc th< \\urld \\£ an: handing In our thildr~n and rh~rr ~hrldr<,.
A' loti.\\ mohtdl"\ leaden 01 u our dun .md our n:spoo\lhllott.
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regional offices, some institutional coherence has been achieved. However, many
national interests continue to prevail in the
decision cycle for prioritization and
resources allocation. By providing the
BHMAC with the operational tools necessary to double its success rate, its ability to
manage relevant national interests will be
substantially reinforced.
3. Donor Fatigue: The general
decline of world economies has caused
international charitable aid and donor government funds to decline from previous
years' contributions. One such example is a
substantial donor to BiH demining efforts,
the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA). For 2003-2008, their
funding is reduced to $750 miJiion as compared to $1.0 billion over the previous fiveyear period. Aggravating this lack of funds
is the lack of progress toward BiH unification. This is affecting donor focus on BiH
and is allowing other more successful countries to take funding precedence. These IC
donations are usually funneled through
two main support areas: NGOs and the

ITF.
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• NGO Aspects: NGOs provide
exposure and fi nancial conduits fo r international inslitlltions and donors. Some NGOs
provide only management services and some
only provide mine-clearing resources, wh ile
ochers even undertake demining o peration; as
quasi-commercial activities. However, commercial activities rend to bid on rhe "easier"
jobs as profit and risk factors limit their investment in the fu ll range of equipment available.
NGOs arc also usually the first ro attract international donors, as donors don't pay directly
ro governments due to suspicion of corruption. Bear in mind that with the exception of
canine counrermining , NGOs arc nor critical
to BiH d emining based on activities to dare.
• Th e lTF and Commercial
Aspects: Commercial dcmining is paid for by
inrcrnario nal donors and rh us comperes with
NCO and AF BiH dcmining dforrs for fund ing. Commercial dcmining reams also suffer
from rhe stigma of corruption th roughout
BiH. This corruption mani fests itself in many
w,1ys and casts suspicion on rhc BHMAC and
the ITF. The ITF is rhe major funding tool for
commncial demining in BiH. Bur these funds
arc waning also. In an arridc on the !Tf websire, Mr. Ccm persek, ITF Director, scared,
"There arc a lot of changes in rhc donors' deci-

sions as ro where they want to place their
money, we are afraid thar rhe donations will
go down and nor up."7 We wish to main tain
our relationship with the ITF but reduce our
dependence on NGOs and commercial operanons.

4. AF BiH Aspects: Here's the
bottom line for the AF BiH: The
Instructions to Parties (ITP) obligates the
AF BiH to demine and they are also obligated to sustain this capability. AF BiH
deminers are capable manual deminers but
lack consistent funding. The BiH government is providing most of the administrative costs, but this support may not survive
the AF BiH restructuring now underway.
The reality is that since Dayton, AF BiH
demining has been largely sustained by
donated capital and equipment. Donations
have also maintained this equipment,
bought consumables, and purchased accident insurance that is required on the demining laws. While factional interests sometimes still prevail, at the grassroots level, AF
BiH soldiers wish to maintain their demining momentum. A commitment to demining is not so obvious at the senior level of
the AF BiH command. AF BiH commanders view demining as a drain on the already
austere defense budget and do not support
incorporating the current 470 deminers
into the new force structure. If we are to be
successful, we must integrate demining
units into the proposed 12,000 soldierrestructuring plan and maintain a minimal
force for combat engineers (mobility/countermobility) .
What
the AF
BiH
Commanders fail to understand is that the
IC sees their current demining components
as the only element of the AF BiH producing a positive contribution to BiH unification. As the AF BiH restructure to join
Partnership for Peace (PfP), BiH demining
expertise is seen as the specialized contribution the AF BiH can make as a potential
member of North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). In this sense, our
demining initiative has global implications.

Although it was a bold d esign, the
im plications of funding challenges, the changing nature of rhe AF BiH restructuring, and
rhe IC's red uced commitment to BiH demining demanded char we make changes ro 1LT
Weber's initial design. After review of th e

design by the MNB(N) Commander, rhe
Stabilization Force (SFOR) Comm-ander and
staff, the U.S. Ambassador to BiH, the OSCE,
the Office of the High Representative (OHR) ,
and other members of the IC, we modified the
in itiative ro m eet rhc new sociopolitical
dynamics. CPT Kyle Shaffe r, OIC of the
SFOR 13 M ine Cell, assisted by MAJ Tom
Barnett, SFOR 13 J oint Military Affai rs
Liaison Officer to SFOR and IC, answered
the challenges posed by these forward looking
diplomatic and military leaders. The design
now focused on creating a more flexible miliraty demining unit with a humanitarian mission at the state level of BiH char can be
phased in based on national and international
mandates. The design focused on several key
objectives thar musr
be supported.
Specifically, rhe design must:
• Provide significant performance
improvements for AF BiH demining rates
• Be supported by a sustained, adequate and regular fu nding arrangemen t
• Be integra red into the ongoi ng AF
restructuring etforrs
• Concentrate responsibili ty and
capabili ties under one management organization
• Create a single organization with
domesric and in ternational mandates
• Be support ed by a legitimate
NATO/EU supervisory ream

Our Proposal for Militarv Demininu
Team with a Humanitarian Mission
The design we are proposing concentrates responsibility and capabilities under
one management organization. This will allow
the unit to immediately address any priorities
designated by the BHMAC regardless of location or size. The design creates a single organization with domestic and international mandares. Once fielded and proven in BiH, rhis
design can be emulated in any of rhe 60 other
nations requiring humanitarian demining.
This will p rovide NATO and rhe world with
a capabili ty rhar has never before been seen in
military organizations, but that will soon be
mandated by rhe changing face of military stabil ization operations. T h rough the use of
NATO/EU supervision, the proposed unit
will reinforce rhe legitimacy of the BiH demining effort, which will in turn attract susrained IC funding for state-of-the-an equipme nt and training. This influx of equipment

alone will enable the unit to realize significant
performance improvements for AF BiH demining operations. Our proposed demining
unit improves the security and long term stabili ty of BiH by accelerati ng rhe removal of
the de facto BiH "Berlin Wall." It also
enhances the AF BiH restructuring plan,
enhances BiH prospects for PfP cooperation,
and provides a highly capable team for rhc
implementation of humanitarian dem ining in
NATO stabil ization operations. This demining initiative is an investmenr in a focused
solution to the BiH mine problem as well as
having implications ro meet global mine
rhrcars. T h is fact alone will make our proposal a key contributor to the U.S . Demining
2010 Initiative char aspires to clear the world
of mines by 2010. The key is rhe simpl icity of
rhe basic units and the flexibility that they
provide. So what will the demining units look
like?
Based on the key objectives above,
the demining initiative we arc p roposing is
fo rmed from nvo key structures. These base
structures are a Heavy Humanitarian Demining Compa ny and a Light Humanitarian
Demining Company.
The
H eavy
Humanitarian
Demining Company (HDC(H)) provides a
combination of manual deminers, EDDTs,
a nd mechanical clearing equipmenr to answer
the needs of complex terrain minefields. This
compa ny p rovides additio nal mech anical
assets rhar are currenrly nor parr of AF BiH
demining reams. The new combination of
mechanical assets will allow the HDC(H) to
clear more congested terrain at smaller levels.
Should heavier equipment be required, rhe
battalion headquarters is equipped ro handle
this need. The HDC(H) provides more readily available mechanical assets throughout BiH
without the current dependence on com mercial activities. T his will allow rhe HDC(H) ro
mechanically prepare minefields more quickly
and ease the work of rhe manual deminers
they support.
The Light H umanitarian Demining
Company (HDC(L)) is focused on manual
demining, which is the only method to dare
that can clear minefields ro humanitarian
standards. Although ir focuses on manual
demining operations, it may assist in preparing areas for mechanical clearing and EDDT.
The key here is to retain the skills and experience of the current manual deminers in rhis
company. T he light company may also be

used to perform surveying that is now perfo rmed by the regional mine action centers
and commercial activities.
Based on mission requirements,
these companies will be task-organized and
placed under the control of a Humanitarian
Demining Ba ttalion (H DBN) command
ream. The barralion headquarters is a key
component as it provides the additional heavy
demining assets required in support of demining operations in BiH. Our goal is to place
these more technologically advanced demining systems d irectly in rhe hands of rhe BiH
demining u nits, allowing them to com plete
the more diffi cult dem ining tasks. Th is is a
dynamic step for a demining unit that unril
now was incapable of hand ling most mechanical demi ning activities. Rather than depending on commercial companies for rhis equipment, the demining battalion headquarters
provides this equipment ar key locations
througho ut BiH when required. Based on
how rhe HDBN is organized, we calculate a
demining rare of I 2-24 sq km per year8 can
be achieved.
The HDBN will report directly to
rhe BiH Stand ing Commi rree on Military
Matters (SCMM), which is a state-level quasiequ ivalent to rhe U.S . Department of
Defense. The BHMAC will continue providing operational direction for the HDBN, but
it wi ll also be supported with direct
NATO/EU supervision. T he NATO/EU
supervision provides rhe required legitimacy
that will attract sustained IC fu nding for scareof-the-art equipment.

Commercia l activities have n or
eliminated
from
the
process.
been
Commercial activities are proficie nt in conducting technical surveys and will continue to
provide this service. However, we propose
reducing commercial demining operations to
focus fund ing o n rhe BiH team . This will
allow BHMAC ro leverage rhe already austere
ITF funds ava ilable by focusing commercial
activities on smaller and less costly demining
projects. This in turn will provide an increase
in rhe success rare of the commercial activities.
To support this change, we are suggesting that
once rhe BHMAC has contracted for rhe commercial activiry, the demining battalion will
coordinate the execution of the contract and
will have oversight of rhc activity. This will
require moving rhe current Field Operations

Manager from rhe BHMAC liaison office ro
rhe HDBN headquarters to ensure commercial acriviries arc coordinated with the AF BiH
activities. Making use of the latest computerized demining support systems, the HDBN
will ensure that commercial activities do nor
"rework" sires, which is seen as the most significant issue for com mercial activities.

As we stated earlier, rhe funds and
diplomatic support for a demining brigade
cannot be realized. But we arc confid ent that
if th e proposed demin ing units are successful,
rhe BiH demining teams will also be able to
focus on international mandates. W ith over
60 countries now in need of immediate demining support, th e need for a humanitarian
demining brigade in NATO or the EU is
inevitable. We view our initiative as rhe initial
step in creating a dem ining unit rhar is capable of dynamic growth ro meet international
demining mandates. This global ream has
added impl ications. One such implication is
assistance in driving the commercial development of demining technologies. As rhe demin ing uni t grows in size, it will generate longterm marker drivers for enhanced equipment
and research from the private sector. This in
turn will help make demining more eco nomically viable and accelerate an end to the global demining issue.

Bottom line
Based on rhe initial review of costs
for the unit, it will require $20-23 million to
implement this plan. Depending on the task
organization of the HDBN, the estimated
operational cost will be between $3 million
and $1 7 million per year and should be totally funded by the BiH government. This will
require char we hold BiH accountable for th is
cost through rhe restructured AF BiH budget
and other BiH government fundi ng. We are
also srill advocating a strong relationship with
the ITF to leverage their fu nds fo r commercial
activities. If rhese funds are properly managed
by BiH with assistance from rhe NATO oversight team, we are confident that past dependence on uncertain donor funds can be significantly reduced if nor eliminated. If som ething
is nor done ro significantly reduce BiH d ependence on rhe IC donors, rhe turure of BiH
demining is uncertain at best.
continued on p3.ge 53. Rethinking Humanitarian
Demining Efforts
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come from the release
of information. The
List of the Articles in the Protocol on
protocol asks the states
Explosive Remnants of War11
and parties to an
armed conflict to provide information, as far
Preamble
as practicable, to assist
Article I: General provision and scope of
mine action. The speapplication
cific list of information
Article 2: Definitions
is provided in th e techand
nical
annex
Article 3: Clearance, removal or destruction
includes:
the
targets
ofERW
for EO, approximate
Article 4: Recording, retaining and transmission
amoums used, the type
of information
and nature of EO, and
Article 5: Other precautions for the protection of
general locations of
the civilian population, individual civilians and
known and probable
UXO. Further, provicivilian objects from the risks and effects of ERW
sion is specifically
Article 6: Provisions for the protection of
made to provide inforhumanitarian missions and organisations from
mation on abandoned
the effects of ERW
munitions, including
Article 7: Assistance with respect to existing ERW
rhe location, approximate numbers and
Article 8: Cooperation and assistance
types of munitions
Article 9: Generic preventive measures
abandoned. Of particArticle I 0: Consultations of high contracting
ular relevance to clearparties
ance and MRE is the
Article Il: Compliance
recommendation that
Technical Annex: Contains the suggested best
information on UXO
should include methpractice for achieving the objectives contained in
ods o f identification
Articles 4, 5 and 9 of this protocol. High
and methods for the
contracting parties will implement this technical
"safe disposal" of EO.?
annex on a voluntary basis.
Agai n, while the path
* Part 1: Recording, storage and
by which information
is passed is not precise,
release of information for UXO and
the text of the protocol
abandoned EO
is clear that NGOs are
* Part II: Warnings, MRE, marking, fencing
included as possible
and monitoring
recipients of informa* Part III: Generic preventive measures
tion.S
The key to rhe
military- mine action
rake a more acti ve role. Recem studies suggest
community relationship will be rhe implethat military units are not ideally suited to all
mentation of rhe Protocol V articles. In many
aspects of mine action, though they do h ave
countries,
contingency plann ing for post-consome relevam capabilities.6 U nder the protoflier
work
is
already done jointly by aid organcol, it could be argued that we will see the milisations and governments. This work now
itaty playing an increased role. However, it is
needs to be expanded to ensure that military
unlikely that we will see rhe military emering
forces
also rake into account the requirements
mine action in larger numbers than in previof the protocol on ERW. T hese issues are nor
ous rimes. T he world's militaries, with limi ted
resources and a large number of competing something that can be field-tested, but by
engaging with the political a nd military actors
tasks, will probably continue to welcome rhe
now, NGOs can at least provide evidence of
assistance of mine action organisations.
rheir experience in these matters, which states
Indeed, rhe protocol repeatedly states rhar
will hopefully recognise as useful for implestares can use a third parry to deal with ERW.
menting the protocol on ERW.
T he second positive impact will

The Fifth Protocol is not perfect.
Many believe thar the language is roo cond itional, and these caveats allow stares ro do litde and yet still legally fu lfil their obligations.
Many would have liked rhe technical annex to
be legally binding. Many of the cri ticisms are
right; from a humanitarian poi nt of view rhe
p rotocol could have been stronger. However,
diplomacy such as these negotiations over the
last three years is rhe art of rhe possible. The
coordinator of the discussions on ERW,
Ambassador
Chr is
Sanders
of
rhe
Netherland s, stated in the final session of
debate that in h is view, the text was the best
that could be achieved at the timc.9
Ambassador Sanders is the only person who is
fu lly aware of the haggling and compromises
required to ger to the final rext; his judgement
that the protocol was the best the process
could produce is probably accurate.
For proponents of a stronger protocol there was some risk to continuing the d iscussions. T he alternative to not agreeing in
November 2003 would have been to p rolong
the discussions for at least another year, if not
more. There were many States and NGOs who
were concerned tha t furthe r negotiatio ns
would result in a further weakening of the text.
The issues had, after all, been exhaustively debared a nd few could see what new grounds for
discussion existed. Significanrly, many of the
srates who agreed w the protocol are nor part
of the Ottawa Convention, including India,
Pakistan, Russia, Ch ina and the United States.
Overall, rhe protocol has the agreeme nt of 92
nations, although the states still have to individually sign the protocol.' 0
If the Fifth Protocol contributes
anything, it is a requirement rhar rhe states
now consider the humanitarian impact of
ERW and they have some guidance on the
measures rhar can be used to reduce the effects
in the post-conflict environment. Much will
depend on how the states will implement the
protocol. Som e of the states have already started to consider the implications of rhe protocol- the United Kingdom used the 2002
Gulf Conflict to rest some of its ideas for dealing with ERW, such as in forma tion provision
to clearance organisations.
The challenge ahead is to ensure
that the protocol is implemented in the
strongest possible manner. While the text of

rhe protocol carries many caveats, such as
"where feasible" and "where possible," it is for
states to d ecide how to incorporate the terms
of the protocol into their military doctrine.
The importance of bow the protocol is implemented is perhaps most clearly shown with
regard to the technical annex. The annex sets
out clear requirements on the provision of
information for ordnance used , the obligations concerning abandoned munitions and to
whom information is to be given; however, ir
is all voluntary. The provisions of the tech nical annex are nor onerous, and it might
becom e a m easure of a stare's commitme nt to
dealing with ERW as to whether or not they
adop t the technical annex along wirh the formal protocol.
The mine action community could
- and should-provide a pivotal role by
engaging with policy makers wherever possible ro ensure that states introduce the terms of
the protocol and the technical an nex into their
military doctrine. For example, the mine
action community can provide field experience to illustrate the importance of information provision in reducing the humani tarian
impact of ERW. For organisations involved in
mine action, now is the opportunity to try to
influence how the protocol is implemented.
Where cou ntries require national legislation to
e nact rhe protocol, political pressure can be
used to ensure that a state introduces all measures of the p rotocol and perhaps goes even
further, for example, by making the provisions
of the technical annex legally binding. Once
procedures and laws are written , ir will be
much more difficult to persuade governments
to rewrite rhem. H ow stares implement the
rreary is where the furure success of the protocol will be decid ed.

I. The full title of rhc convention is ''The Co nvem ion
on Prohi bitions or Restrictions on rhe Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons \XIhich May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects."
The framework convention has five prorocols, which ban or
restrict rhe use o f various types of weapons that are deemed
to cause unnecessary suffering or affect ei th er sold iers or
civilians indiscrim ina tely. The weapons covered include:
weapons thar leave undetectable fragments in the body
(Pro rocol I); mines, booby-traps and ot·her devices
(Prorocol II, amended in 1996); incendiary weapons
(Proroeol Ill); blindi ng laser weapons (Protoco l IV); a nd
ERW (Prorocol V). A5 of March 2004, rhere were 92 states

that were party to the convenrion.
2. For a history of how the ERW process began and
was developed, see: "Explosive Remna nts of War: The
Impact of Curren t N egotiations," Paul Ellis 1 journal of

Mine Action. Issue 7 .1 , April 2003; and "' Explosive
RemnarHS of\XIar: The Negotiations Contin ue," Paul Ellis,
Journal o[Mi1u Actio11, i>sue 7.2, August 2003.
3. The definition of EO excl udes mines, booby tra ps
and orhe r devices as defined in Prorocol II of rhe CCW.
While there is rarely a clear disrincrion between rhe location
of mines and UXO. booby traps and rdued devices could
nor be included in rhis protocol on ER\V for legal reasons,
as they already had th eir own Prmocol (II. amended 1996).
4. Vicrim assistance does nor have the same prominence in Protocol V as in [he Onawa Conventi on. The
issue of how much prominence to give tO vicrim assistance
was strongly debated. A number of countries, parricubrlr
South Africa, argued for much !ltronger provision for this
area. ln the end it was nor possible ro do m o re rhan include
ir as a paragraph in Article 8 on Cooperat ion and
Assistance.
5. Article 3 of the prowcol on "CIC"arance, Removal or
Destruction of ER\Xf.'' paragraph 5. states: "High
Contracting Parries shall cooperate, where appropriate,
both among themselves and with other states, relevant
regio na l and inrcrnarional organisations and non·govern~
memaJ organisations on the provision of inter alia tcchn i~
cal, financial, material and human resources assistance
including, in appropriate circum stances, the undertak ing of
joint operations necessary ro fulfil rhe provisions of this

Article...
6. See Tbe Role ofth' Military in M i11e Action, GICHD,
2003.
7. The rechnical annex has adopted many of the in for~
marion requirements thar the rnine action commu nity
asked for, see the report Explmivt' Rttnnmw of \f'nrJnfonnmion Requiremen/s, G ICHD , 2003.
8. In Tec hn ical Annex l.c.ii, it is stated that:
"Recipient: The information should be released ro rhe party
or parties in conrrol of rhe affecred territory and to those
persons or insti tutions that the releasing Stare is satisfied
are, or will be, involved in UXO or AXO !abandoned
explosive ord na nce] clearance in the affected area. in the
education of rhe civilian population on rhe risks of UXO
and AXO."
9 . Paul Ellis' personal norcs from the Meeting of the
Group of Government Experts to the CC\'7, Geneva, 24
November 2003.
I0. The protocol will come inro fOrce six months after
the 20th rJ.tification by a srare.
11. T he full tt:xt of rhe convenrion in rhe six l anguage.~
of rhe United Narions can be fo un d on rhe GICH D websire at: http://www.gichd.ch/CCW/index.htm or rhe UN
Departmen t of Disarmament Affai rs websir~: hrtp://
disarmamenr2.un.orglccw/index. html, accessed 29 March
2004 .

Rethinking Humanitarian Demining Efforts, continued
from page 27

Conclusion
So where do we go from here?
Although our focus is to eliminate donor
funding in rl1c fut ure, we are worki ng with the
IC and the BHMAC ro generate donor funding for rhe initial equipment costs. We are
confident that lC donors will support this initiative based on rhe much-improved rate of
return for their investment in this future EU
member. Over the next few months, the team
will be working with the SFOR AF BiH
Restructuring Working Group to integrate
rh is demining initiative into rhe future of
BiH. Based on guidance from the OHR, the
new military structure for BiH is to be implem ented in Januaty of 2004. The Defense
Review Co mmission is working diligently to
resolve any legislative or legal roadblocks fo r
restructuring success. lf we are successful, the
ream sees this as the beginning of a new era fo r
coalition military operations. BiH is at a crossroads in its history where it may be the best
suited and most capable country to help coalition countries m ake this paradigm shift.
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